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COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF EXCESS AND PRIMARY AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR DEFENSE COSTS
INTRODUCTION
The supplementary payments provision of the Standard Family Au-
tomobile Policy covers "all expenses incurred by the company" and "all
costs taxed against the insured in any suit."1 Insofar as there is any
conflict between insured and insurer as to who should pay defense costs,
the policy language seems quite clear:
The words "all costs" mean just that. They do not admit of the
interpretation urged by the appellant. If appellant had wished
to contract to pay only a proportionate share of costs based on
the applicable limits of liability in the policy, it could easily have
used appropriate language to achieve that result.2
If there is other insurance covering the same insured, a company
may seek reimbursement from the other insurer for amounts paid in
settlement of judgment. For example, should an "excess" insurer de-
fend and successfully settle a claim against an insured, most states
would allow full recovery of the settlement from the primary insurance
company, as long as the settlement was within the limits of liability of
the primary insurer. However, there is also a question as to defense
costs and whether they can be recovered from the primary insurer. This
comment is directed at a resolution of that issue.
APPLICATION OF "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES AND THEIR EFFECT
The typical situation in which the Other Insurance Clause comes
into effect is that where the named insured borrows another car which
he does not own, or drives a car insured by his employer. Thus, in
addition to the insurance on the automobile, the insured will also have
his own policy covering his personal automobile. Insofar as insurance
on the borrowed or employer's car is concerned, the applicable pro-
vision of the Other Insurance Clause is the pro rata one:
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by
part I of this policy the company shall not be liable under this
policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable
limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total ap-
plicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance
against such loss .... 3
'For an annotated copy of the 1967 Standard Family Automobile Liability
Policy, see N. RisJoRD AND J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
CASES, STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 258 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as N. RISJORD AND J. AUSTIN].
2 Liberty NaVl Ins. Co. v. Eberhart, 398 P.2d 997, 1000 (Alaska, 1965).
3 N. RISJORD AND J. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 62.
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The applicable section of the Other Insurance Clause which would per-
tain to the insured's own personal policy is the excess provision which
provides that:
[T]he insurance with respect to a temporary substitute or non-
owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance.4
Pro Rata v. Excess-The Various Solutions
At least one court has given effect to both the pro rata and excess
clause by holding the pro rata insurer liable for its pro rata share and
the excess insurer liable for the excess over that amount, up to the
limits of its policy.5 Another minority position is the "Lamb-Weston
Doctrine," so named after the case of Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon
Automobile Insurance Company.6 The plaintiff in this case had double
insurance coverage with Other Insurance Clauses identical to those
quoted above. The trial court held that the pro rata insurer was pri-
marily liable and, consequently, liable for the full amount of the loss,
since the total loss fell within the policy limits. However, on appeal,
the Oregon Supreme Court reversed. After reviewing the theories ap-
plied to the problem, the court concluded:
It is our view that any attempt to give effect to the "other
insurance" provision of one policy while rejecting it in another
is like pursuing a will o' the wisp....
In our opinion, whether one policy uses one clause or another,
when any come in conflict with the "other insurance" clause of
another insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they are
in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto. 7
In later cases, Oregon has consistently followed the Lamb-Weston
decision, and in Fireman's Insurance Company v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Company," the Oregon Supreme Court offered further
justification:
This court believes it is good public policy not to put an injured
plaintiff, or a defendant who is fortunate enough to have dupli-
cate coverage, in a position where there is any possibility one
insurer can say, "After you, my dear Alphonse !" while the other
says, "Oh no, after you, my dear Gaston !" They must walk arm
in arm through the door of responsibility.9
4 Id.
5 American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 157 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. S.C. 1957).
6219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959).
7 Id. at 122, 124, 341 P.2d at 115, 119.
s243 Ore. 10, 411 P.2d 271 (1966).
9 Id. at 15, 411 P.2d at 274. For other cases which have also approved appor-
tionment between pro rata and excess clause insurance policies, see Annot.,
76 A.L.R. 2d 512 (1961). For further arguments in favor of the Oregon




The majority of courts attempt to give effect to the intent and mean-
ing of Other Insurance Clauses. Under this approach, when one policy
contains a pro rata clause and the other an excess clause, full effect
will be given to the excess clause, leaving the insurer whose policy
contains the pro rata clause primarily liable. Thus, the insurer with the
pro rata clause must bear the whole loss, up to the imits of its policy,
and then the excess insurer is liable for any balance, up to the limits of
its policy. Effect is given to the meaning of the policies by holding that
the pro rata insurance is "other insurance" within the meaning of that
term in the excess clause-thus giving the excess insurance clause full
force and effect. However, the policy containing the excess insurance
is not considered "other insurance" within the meaning of that term
as used in the pro rata clause, and therefore the pro rata clause is not
operative.
[T]he liability of the excess insurer does not arise until the limits
of the collectible insurance under the primary policy have been
exceeded. It should be noted that under this rule, the courts give
no application to the other insurance clause in the primary policy,
which provides that if the additional insured has other valid and
collectible insurance, he shall not be covered by the primary pol-
icy. That is because the insurance under the excess coverage
policy is not regarded as other collectible insurance, as it is not
available to the insured until the primary policy has been ex-
hausted. Or, to put it another way, a non-ownership clause, with
an excess coverage provision, does not constitute other valid and
collectible insurance within the meaning of a primary policy with
an omnibus clause.10
Wisconsin
There are two Wisconsin cases which deal specifically with concur-
rent coverage between a pro rata and excess clause. In Lubow v.
Morrissey,"" the defendant struck the plaintiff, a pedestrian, while driv-
ing a car loaned him by a garage while a car furnished by his employer
was being repaired. The garage's policy contained the following pro-
ration~clause:
"If the insured has other insurance ... the company shall not
be liable under this policy for a greater proration of such loss
than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations
bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and collectible in-
surance against such loss.'12
10 8 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRAcricE § 4914 (1962). See also Comment,
65 CoL. L. REv. 319 (1965), condensed at 1965 PERS. INi. Commi. ANN. 207;
Note, 38 MliNN. L. Rxv. 838 (1954); Barksdale, Conflicting Decisions on
Primary and Excess Coverage Under Automobile Liability Policies, 1965 INs.
COUN. J. 158; Annot., 76 A.L.R. 2d 502 (1961).
"113 Wis. 2d 114, 108 N.W.2d 156 (1961).
12 Id. at 121, 108 N.W.2d at 161.
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The policy provided by the defendant's employer covered the defendant
in this situation, stating that coverage as to a temporary substitute auto-
mobile "'shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible
insurance.' "13
On appeal, the court acknowledged Reetz v. Werch,1 4 a case dealing
with two excess insurance clauses, neither of which was given effect,
with liability thus prorated between the two excess insurers. However,
the conflict between a pro rata clause and an excess clause was "not so
completely frontal as it was between the excess clauses considered in
Reetz v. Werch."' 5 Thus, the court adopted the majority approach and
attempted to give meaning to the excess clause.
In the Liberty Mutual [excess insurer] policy before us, the ex-
cess clause does not apply to the coverage for which the policy
was primarily written, and does apply only to certain types of
coverage of automobiles not owned by the named insured. In
such situations it is to be anticipated that there will be coverage
under another policy issued primarily to provide such coverage.
Apparently insurers frequently, if not ordinarily, intend to bear
a greater responsibility where the coverage may be termed pri-
mary than that which they bear under other types of coverage,
and the courts have considered that such usage itself provides a
rational basis for giving an excess clause controlling effect in a
conflict such as is presented here.19
Lubow v. Morrissey was reaffirmed in Groth v. Farmers Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company,17 where the pro rata clause was identi-
cal to the one quoted above. The court in Groth stated:
[W]here there is a conflict between the proration clause of one
policy and the excess-coverage clause of another policy, the con-
flict is resolved by holding that the proration clause must be ap-
plied as if the insurance provided by the policy, whose excess-
coverage clause is applicable, were not available to the insured. s
The primary insurer in Groth also had an excess coverage clause which
the court found had no application, "[B ] ecause this excess coverage pro-
vision is expressly confined to temporary substitute automobiles or auto-
mobiles other than the insured vehicle."' 9
Conclusion
In Wisconsin, the primary insurer is liable for the total amount of
any recovery that does not exceed the policy limits. However, it does
not automatically follow that an excess insurer can also recover the costs
131 Id. at 120, 108 N.W.2d at 160.
14 8 Wis. 2d 388, 98 N.W.2d 924 (1959).
15 13 Wis. 2d at 123, 108 N.W.2d at 161.
16 Id. at 123-24, 108 N.W.2d at 162. The court also cited with approval 2 APPLE-
MAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACICE § 4914 (1962).
1721 Wis. 2d 655, 124 N.W.2d 606 (1963).
18 Id. at 660, 124 N.W.2d at 608.
19 Id. at 659, 124 N.W.2d at 608
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expended in defending the insured covered by both policies. Courts are
not unanimous in allowing an excess insurer recovery for defense costs.
Those that have allowed recovery do so on the basis of subrogation.
Other courts hold that an insurer's duty to defend is personal as between
the insured and the insurer, and deny an excess insurer the right of
recovery for defense costs. Using this general dichotomy (subrogation
versus the personal nature of the duty to defend), cases dealing with
the recovery of defense costs between primary and excess insurers will
be analyzed in an attempt to establish what should be the rights of two
such co-insurers.
SUBROGATION OF DEFENSE COSTS
Theory of Subrogation
The equitable doctrine of subrogation is a means of making the
wrongdoer pay for his misconduct and reduce substantially the costs
of insurance to the insurer and the insured.
As a working definition in automobile insurance cases, subroga-
tion may be said to be that right acquired by one party, upon
the involuntary payment of the sum of money for which he is
only secondarily liable, to pursue a third person. This right is
coupled with a right to abrogate the original contract if the payee
releases the wrongdoer prior to payment, and an affirmative right
to recoup from the payee if he releases the wrongdoer subsequent
to a payment under the policy.20
In D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Products Company,2 the Wisconsin
court stated:
Subrogation may properly be applied when a person other than
a mere volunteer pays a debt or demand which in equity and
good conscience should be satisfied by another. The doctrine rests
upon the theory of unjust enrichment.22
Subrogation is of two kinds, legal and conventional. Legal subrogation
is effected by operation of law and arises out of a relationship. It is the
substitution of one person for another, with reference to a claim or
right. Being equitable in nature, it depends neither on contract nor on
privity of parties.3
Convention subrogation is contractual and the rights of the insurer
depend upon the terms of the contract and the rights of the insured.
Conventional subrogation may be effective where legal subrogation
20 Billings, The Significance of Subrogation in Automobile Insurance Practice,
1948 INs. L. J. 707 (Sept.).
21 19 Wis. 2d 390, 120 N.W2d 70 (1963).
2Id. at 399-400, 120 N.W.2d at 75. "Subrogation is closely akin to, if not part
of, the equitable principle of 'restitution' and 'unjust' enrichment. The ob-ject of subrogation is ... to promote and accomplish justice [and to prevent
injustice, and] is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate pay-
ment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity and good conscience, should
pay it." 83. C.J.S. Subrogation § 2 (1953).
23 Stroh v. O'Hearn, 176 Mich. 164, 142 N.W. 865 (1913) ; Kennedy-Ingalls Corp.
v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 92 N.W2d 247 (1958).
19691
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
would fail because its requirements were not fulfilled. The standard
subrogation clause in the automobile liability policy is an example of
conventional subrogation:
In the event of any payment under this policy, the company shall
be subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor
against any person or organization and the insured shall execute
and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is nec-
essary to secure such rights. The insured shall do nothing after
loss to prejudice those rights.2 4
It can be argued that conventional subrogation is available to the excess
insurer seeking reimbursement from the primary insurer for costs ex-
pended in defense of the common insured. However, in allowing the
excess insurer recovery for defense costs, most decisions have been
based on legal or equitable subrogation.2 5
Allowance of Subrogation for Defense Costs
One of the earliest cases to allow an excess insurer recovery against
a primary insurer for defense costs was Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company,26 a case in which the in-
sured drove a loaned automobile insured by Buckeye. The insured had
his own automobile liability policy with Aetna, but since the insured
was driving a temporary substitute car at the time of the accident.
Aetna was the excess insurer. Buckeye refused to defend, and Aetna
settled within the limits of coverage provided by the primary insurance;
Aetna then brought an action to recover amounts paid, including the
costs of defense. The trial court ruled that Aetna had acted as a "mere
volunteer" and could not recover. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed, and held that Aetna was not a volunteer in settling, but was
secondarily liable.
It is well settled that one secondarily liable, who is forced to
pay because of the refusal, or failure after demand, of the one
primarily liable to discharge the obligation, has the right of in-
demnity from the one primarily liable.2 7
24 N. RisJORD AND J. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 263.
25 The reciprocal rights and duties of co-insurers to one another do not depend
upon contract but upon the principles of equitable subrogation. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 250 Cal. App. 2d 538, 58 Cal. Rptr. 639(1967). See also New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds,
London, 34 Ill. App. 2d 69, 173 N.E.2d 543 (1961); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Marquette Cas. Co., 143 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1962) ; National Farmers Union
Property & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1962);
Western Pac. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 69 Wash. 2d 11, 416 P2d 468(1966). However, see Zurich Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 117 Ga.
App. 426, 160 S.E.2d 603 (1968) and Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buckeye Union
Cas. Co., in which the claim of the excess insurer for defense costs was al-
lowed under the subrogation clause of the policy. See generally 7A APPLEmAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4691 (1962) and American Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d
453 (5th Cir. 1960).
26 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N.E.2d 568 (1952).
271 d. at 392, 105 N.E.2d at 571-72.
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Thus, Aetna had an equitable right to recover defense costs from Buck-
eye. In a later case, another Ohio court allowed the excess insurer re-
covery of all costs of defense incurred in settling the claim, even though
the limits of liability of the primary insured were $5,000 and the claim
was settled for $20,000.28
The case most often cited in which subrogation for defense costs
was allowed is Continental Casualty Company v. Zurich Insurance Com-
pany.20 In this case, three insurance companies, Zurich, Continental,
and General, insured the same party. Zurich was held to be the primary
insurer, but it had refused to defend. The trial court ordered that all
three companies share the cost of defense on a pro rata basis in the
same ratio that they shared in paying the injured party. Zurich claimed
that the duty to defend was personal to the insurers and that this duty
could not be divided. Zurich cited Financial Indemnity Company v.
Colonial Insurance Company 0 as authority, in which the court had said:
[T]he agreement to defend is not only completely independent
of and severable from the indemnity provisions of the policy, but
is completely different. Indemnity contemplates merely the pay-
ment of money. The agreement to defend contemplates the ren-
dering of services. 31
However, this argument was negated and, on that point, Financial In-
demnity was overruled.
In this connection we note that any services contemplated by the
agreement to defend are not personal in the sense that the services
of any specifically named individual would be personal. Rather,
such services necessarily contemplate the employment by the com-
pany of competent licensed attorneys and other personnel who,
from a practical standpoint, must be viewed as rendering services
to the company and for its benefit of other obligated insurers,
as well as for the benefit of the insured.3
2
The court then went on to affirm the trial court and to apply the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation that requires any obligated carrier, which
refuses to defend, to share in the costs of the insured's defense.
A contrary result would simply provide a premium or offer a
possible windfall for the insurer who refuses to defend, and thus,
by leaving the insured to his own resources, enjoys a chance that
the costs of defense will be provided by some other insurer at
no expense to the company which declines to carry out its con-
tractual commitments.33
28 Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Secured Cas. Co., 87 Ohio L. Abst. 459, 180
N.E.2d 297 (Ct. of C.P., Summit Co. 1961).
20 17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 366 P.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
30 132 Cal. App. 2d 207, 281 P.2d 883 (1955).
311d. at 211, 281 P.2d at 885.
32 17 Cal. Rptr. at 18, 366 P.2d at 461.
33 Id. at 18, 366 P.2d at 461. See also Government Employees Ins. Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 186, 52 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966) ; Pacific
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Louisiana allows equitable subrogation of defense costs in favor of
the excess insurer.3 4 However, in Allstate Insurance Company v. At-
lantic Mutual Insurance Company, 5 the excess insurer recovered only
those amounts spent in defense before the primary insurer took over the
defense. In this case, the excess insurer had spent $784.68 in providing
a defense for the insured before the primary insurer was willing to de-
fend. After the primary insurer assumed the defense, the excess insurer
was a mere volunteer and could not recover an additional $2,319.85
spent in defending the case.
In the absence of some action on the part of the defendant equiva-
lent to abandonment of its defense or a notice from defendant
plaintiff to obtain its own counsel, all of which is absent in this
case, the action of plaintiff was voluntary on its part.3 6
It should also be noted that the primary insurer settled within the limits
of its coverage, and the excess insurer was not held liable for any
portion of the settlement.
Subrogation and Defense Costs: An Inconsistent Application
Basic to establishing the rights of subrogation is a finding that the
party making payment is secondarily liable. There is no question that
an excess insurer becomes secondarily liable for any judgment or set-
tlement which the insured must pay. This is the language of the Other
Insurance Clause in automobile policies and, as already indicated, 37 most
courts have given that clause full effect. However, the Other Insurance
Clause does not include defense costs so as to render the excess insurer
secondarily liable for such expenses, in addition to costs of damages.
The standard Other Insurance provision reads as follows:
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by Part
I of this policy, the company shall not be liable under this policy
for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit
of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable
limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such
loss. 38
The "loss" referred to in this clause is limited by the declarations in the
policy. However, defense costs are not so limited, and are payable "in
addition to the applicable limits of liability"3 9 under the supplementary
Indem. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1965). "Where there has been more than one insurer of the same risk,
several courts have held that that costs of defense may be divided among
them. And this would seem to be the better view. If two insurers have agreed
to assume the defense of the same action, one should not be allowed to escape
that duty and place the entire burden on the other, by virtue of a breach
of its obligation." 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691 (1962).
-4 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marquette Cas. Co., 143 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1962).
35 187 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1966).
36 Id. at 776.
37 Supra, note 10.




payment provisions. Therefore, an excess insurer cannot become sec-
ondarily liable for defense costs on the basis of the Other Insurance
Clause in the policy. It is true that subrogation, "being equitable in
nature[,] . . . depends neither on contract nor privity of parties. '40
Thus, subrogation can apply irrespective of the policy language. How-
ever, in examining the Other Insurance Clause, we are merely seeking
to establish the relationship between the insured and the excess insurer
and whether such a relationship maintains a "primary" status. Since
the Other Insurance Clause does not include defense costs, the rela-
tionship between the insured and excess insurer remains primary. If
an excess insurer remains primarily liable for defense costs and cannot
obtain the standing of secondary liability, it would seem that an excess
insurer cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable subrogation-an equit-
able remedy based on secondary liability. 41
Assuming, arguendo, that the status of secondary liability as to de-
fense costs can be achieved, courts have been inconsistent in applying
the theory. The Other Insurance Clause renders an excess carrier liable
only when the policy limits of the primary insurer are exceeded. At that
time, an excess insurer must assume liability and is responsible for any
amount of loss up to the applicable limits of liability. It follows that once
the limits of the primary insurer are exceeded, the excess insurer is no
longer secondarily liable-and thus would also be liable for defense
costs. For example, in a case where a $20,000 judgment is returned
against a common insured, and the limits of liability of both the excess
and primary carrier are $10,000, the defense costs should be prorated
according to the limits of liability-in this case each carrier paying one-
half.42 However, some courts have allowed an excess insurer to recover
all costs of defense, even though the primary limits of liability were
exceeded.43 This inconsistent application of subrogation is illustrated in
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Secured Casualty Com-
40 Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 92 N.W.2d 247 (1958).
41 "The Other Insurance conditions refer only to loss. There is no policy au-
thority for prorating claim expenses in accordance with policy provisions or
otherwise. The result seems equitable but it is not authorized by policy pro-
visions." N. RisjoRD AND J. AusTIN, supra note 1, comment to Case No. 157,
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. Minn.
1954).
It is apparent that any holding that defense costs are included in the
Other Insurance Clause is, at best, questionable. Because of this doubt or
ambiguity, the policy should be construed against the insurer. Kopp v. Home
Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959). Thus, an excess in-
surer should not be able to take advantage of an ambiguous section of the
policy to obtain secondary liability status, a posture which will enable him
to escape liability.42 See Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 366 P.2d 455
(Sup. Ct. 1961).43 American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Canal Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958);
Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 30 Ill. 2d 69, 173 N.E.2d
543 (1961; Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Secured Cas. Co., 87 Ohio L. Abst.
459, 180 N.E.2d 297 (Ct. of C.P., Summit Co. 1961).
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pany,44 where the primary insurer refused to defend and the excess
insurer settled the claim for $20,000. The applicable limit of liability of
the primary insurer was $5,000, and $200,000 was the coverage of the
excess insurer. In the action by the excess insurer against the primary
insurer, the court allowed a recovery of $7,575.67: the limits of the
primary insurer's liability, plus $2,575.67 for court costs and costs of
defense. The court, by allowing the excess insurer recovery for all
defense costs, reached a result which is clearly inconsistent with the
underlying theory of subrogation that requires secondary liability. As-
suming that subrogation applies to defense costs between two insurance
companies, the costs in Fidelity should have been prorated on the basis
of policy limits once the excess insurer became primarily liable under
the Other Insurance Clause.
The Duty to Defend-A Personal Contract
In addition to the conceptual problems surrounding subrogation of
defense costs, courts denying an excess insurer the right of subrogation
against a primary insurer have done so on the grounds that the duty
to defend is personal and nothing more than the insurer's expense of
doing business.
More important, the duty to defend is personal to the relation-
ship of this insurer and this assured. Whatever may be the right
ultimately to saddle off a part of the cost of defense actually
undertaken once payment has been made and a right comparable
to subrogation is being asserted, it is contrary to the very nature
of the contract that the insurer can scout around in hopes that
it can find someone whose defense the assured is compelled to
accept.45
A recent Minnesota case which fully discusses the rights of excess and
primary insurance companies as to the costs of defense is Iowa Mutual
Insurance Company v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company.46
The only issue in that case was the right of an excess insurer to recover
from a primary insurer the costs and expenses incurred prior to the
primary insurer's assumption of responsibility and settlement of the
case. 7 The trial court allowed the excess insurer, Iowa Mutual, to re-
44 87 Ohio L. Abst. 459, 180 N.E.2d 297 (Ct. of C.P., Summit Co. 1961).
45 American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Continental Cas. Co. v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. American Family Ins. Group, 199 Kan. 373, 429 P.2d 931 (1967):
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn., 362, 150
N.W.2d 233 (1967) ; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhoades, 405 S.W.2d 812
(Tex. 1966).
46 276 Minn. 362, 150 N.W.2d 233 (1967).
47 The primary insurer had claimed that it did not provide coverage to the com-
mon insured, and the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Lowry v. Kneeland, 263
Minn. 537, 117 N.W.2d 207 (1962), held that Universal Underwriters did
provide common coverage. After this decision, the excess insurer, Iowa
[Vol. 52
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cover defense costs and expenses totaling $3,703.83. On appeal, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the excess insurer could
not recover the costs of defense. The court ruled out any application
of contribution between the two companies, since there was no joint
or common undertaking. Both the excess and primary insurers were
obligated to defend under separate contracts.- s
As to subrogation, the equities between the two insurance companies
were equal, and each of them had a separate and distinct obligation to
defend:
"Since he incurred no expenses or damages in this respect, and
since the obligation for attorney's fees and expenses which plain-
tiff incurred was required under its own policy, it would follow
that plaintiff acquired no rights against defendant under the
subrogation clause referred to."'49
The court then recited the supplementary payments provision of the
Standard Family Automobile Policy and held that the expenses, which
the excess insurer was seeking to recover, were what any automobile
liability insurer expects to incur.
Iowa Mutual [the excess insurer] received premiums from Knee-
land to assume the risk of insuring these expenses. Moreover, the
expenses incurred in the third-party action were primarily ex-
pended to protect its own interests. These charges are not in
the nature of a payment of a debt for which another was primar-
ily liable. They are Iowa Mutual's expense of doing business.50
Thus, the Other Insurance Clause was virtually ignored and the excess
insurer continued to be primarily liable for defense costs.
Wisconsin
To date, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not had the question of
defense costs between excess and primary insurers properly before it.
In Lubow v. Morrissey,5 the issue was raised prematurely and no
definitive statements were made by the court ;52 the court also refused
Mutual, brought an action to recover the defense costs spent prior to the
primary insurer's assumption of control of the case.48 The right to contribution is an independent right founded upon principles
quite different from those upon which the right of subrogation is based.
The obligation to respond in contribution arises only after one of several
parties, equally liable for the same debt, pays more than his pro rata share
of the common debt. The cause of action does not exist until such a payment
is made. But where the doctrine of subrogation applies, the subrogee becomes
the owner of the very rights of the obligee; their rights are not similar or
analogous, but identical. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Brown Root Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257(D.C. Tex. 1950).
49 276 Minn. 369, 150 N.W.2d 237, quoting American Sur. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Mlinn., 81, 85, 142 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1966).
50 Id. at 370, 150 N.W.2d at 238.
5113 Wis. 2d 114, 108 N.W.2d 156 (1961).
52 "All three insurers had, and continue to have an obligation to provide Morris-
sey with defense. It seems premature to make any adjustment among them




to grant the excess insurer, Liberty Mutual, a motion for summary
judgment dismissal. Liberty Mutual argued that since the amount de-
manded in the complaint of the plaintiff was $30,000 and the amount
of coverage provided by the primary insurer was $200,000, the motion
for dismissal should be granted. The court agreed that Liberty Mutual
should not be retained as a proper defendant on the unlikely possibility
of the plaintiff's being able to collect from Liberty Mutual. Nonetheless,
Liberty Mutual's motion for dismissal was denied. It was pointed out
that the statute in question, Wisconsin Statute section 260.11 (1967),
establishes an insurer as a proper party defendant when that insurer
"[B]y its policy agrees to prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to
engage counsel or prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the
costs of litigation." On the basis of its agreement to defend and pay "all
expenses" under the supplementary payments provision, Liberty Mutual
was held to be a proper defendant.
In retaining the excess insurer as a proper party defendant, the
court in Lubow bad to make a distinction between the duty to defend
and an insurer's liability to pay sums which the insured became ob-
ligated to pay as damages arising out of the use of his car. The duty to
defend was not remote or on the same level as the liability to pay a
judgment. Thus, in the application of Wisconsin Statute section 260.11
(1967), the Other Insurance Clause did not diminish in any way the
excess insurer's duty to defend. From this it would appear that an
excess insurer cannot become secondarily liable for defense costs. How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether the Wisconsin court will apply the
same reasoning to a case involving defense costs between primary and
excess insurers, and deny the right of subrogation to the excess insurer.
CONCLUSION
The remedy of subrogation is highly favored in the law and is an
equitable principle which courts are inclined to extend and give a
liberal application.53 Nonetheless, the application of subrogation to de-
fense costs between insurance companies is a questionable policy. The
basis of subrogation, secondary liability, is a difficult standing to achieve
when the Other Insurance Clause in the policy does not apply to defense
costs. In addition, the insured has not suffered any real damage as
long as the excess insurer does in fact defend the common insured. Thus,
the insured in such a situation does not have any basis on which to sue
the primary insurer for a failure to pay the costs and expenses of a
defense.
Finally, in almost all cases of dispute between a primary and excess
insurer over the costs of defense, the named insured has borrowed a
car belonging to another, or is driving a car insured by his employer.
5383 C.J.S. Subrogation § 14 (1953).
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Thus the primary insurer (the insurer, of the car) is an omnibus in-
surer, and the insured is a party with whom the primary insurer has
had little or no contact. On the other hand, the excess insurer is usually
the personal insurance company of the common insured with whom the
insured has had negotiations, prior experience, and personal contact.
In this situation, it is not surprising that the insured looks first to his
own personal company (the excess insurer) for legal help and reim-
bursement-and this is expected by the excess insurer. Given this situ-
ation, it is doubtful if the issue of defense costs between primary and
excess insurance companies justifies use of the equitable doctrine of
subrogation.
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